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Comments
The Pennsylvania Prompt Trial Rule:
Is the Remedy Worse Than the Disease?
I. Rule 1100 in Perspective
The United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo' posited that it
is "impossible to determine with precision when the right to a speedy trial
has been denied.' '2 Consequently the Court proposed a balancing test
comprised of four elements: the length of delay, the reason for delay, the
defendant's assertion of the speedy trial right, and prejudice to the
defendant. The Court further stated that although the Constitution didnot
mandate quantification of the period within which a defendant must be
brought to trial,3 neither did it preclude a rule promulgated by a court in the
exercise of its supervisory powers that created a precise test.4 By imple-
menting Rule of Criminal Procedure 1100,1 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court seized upon the opportunity to institute an objective prompt trial
standard. The Pennsylvania court further acknowledged that the speedy
trial test articulated by the Barker court constituted only the minimal
safeguard of the federal constitutional right and was inadequate to provide
the criminal defendant the protection guaranteed by article I, section 9 of
the Pennsylvania constitution.
6
A. Interests Protected by the Right to Speedy Trial
1. Societal Interest.-The Barker court perceived that society has a
greater interest in the speedy trial right than in other sixth amendment
rights.7 Because of this presumed societal interest, a defendant's apparent
lack of desire for a prompt trial has not foreclosed inquiry into the speedy
1. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
2. Id. at 521.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 530 n.29.
5. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100 (hereinafter cited as rule 1100). The rule became effective
prospectively after June 30, 1973.
6. Commonwealth v. Whitaker,- Pa. -, 359 A.2d 174, 176 (1976); see Common-
wealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297, 302-09, 297 A.2d 127, 129-33 (1972). A thorough analysis of
the cases interpreting the speedy trial guarantee of the Pennsylvania constitution, art. I, § 9,
prior to Commonwealth v. Hamilton, may be found in Comment, Speedy Trial Guarantees in
Pennsylvania: The Impact of Rule 1100, 78 DICK. L. REV. 755, 757-62 (1974). It is noteworthy
that prior to Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), the Pennsylvania constitution
was construed as affording the accused less relief than the sixth amendment guarantee.
Compare Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434,440 (1973) with Commonwealth ex rel. Smith
v. Patterson, 409 Pa. 500, 503, 187 A.2d 278,279 (1963) andCommonwealth ex rel. Graham v.
Meyers, 194 Pa. Super. Ct. 561, 564, 168 A.2d 796, 797 (1961).
7. 407 U.S. at 519.
trial issue.8 Thus, vindication of the individual right of the accused has
been partially transformed into a means of effectuating various policy
objectives. Among them are enhancement of the effective prosecution of
criminal cases, 9 reformation of the criminal justice system,'° elicitation of
an increased allocation of resources to the judicial process, I I maximization
of the deterrent and rehabilitative effects of prosecution and conviction,' 
2
minimization of the likelihood of recidivism during the pretrial period,
13
reduction in the expense of pretrial incarceration,1 4 and cultivation of
public respect for the processes of law enforcement.15
The societal interest in effective prosecution cannot, however, be
characterized as a mere penchant for immediate disposition. Whereas strict
enforcement of speedy trial measures will bring the accused to justice
without delay, the remedy for noncompliance with such measures may
inflict severe social cost. 16 In Pennsylvania, for example, the remedy for
noncompliance with rule 1100 is dismissal of the outstanding charges with
prejudice. Society, however, in addition to its interest in prompt disposi-
tion, has a cognizable interest in having the guilt or innocence of the
accused determined. Indeed, the criminal justice system owes society the
duty not to abort trials, but rather to conduct proceedings expeditiously.
Consequently the speedy trial rights of the defendant have traditionally
been compromised by the uncertain standards invoked to protect the
constitutional guarantee, notwithstanding that both federal and state con-
stitutions assure rights to the defendant and not primarily to society. To
avoid the release of defendants on speedy trial grounds, the courts have
shown a proclivity for interpreting and applying these standards in .a
manner that emphasizes the societal interest in a final adjudication at the
expense of the defendant's right to a speedy trial.17
8. SeeCommonwealth v. Thomas, 28 Som. 310, 316 (Pa. C.P. 1973);ABAPROJECTON
STANDARD FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SPEEDY TRIAL § 2.2, comment at 17 (approved draft 1968)
(hereinafter cited as ABA SPEEDY TRIAL STANDARDS). See generally United States v.
Beberfeld, 408 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
9. See Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 42 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); ABA
SPEEDY TRIAL STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 1.1 at 10; Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20
STAN. L. REV. 476, 476 n.1 (1968).
10. See Comment, CriminalLaw: Crowded Dockets No Longer Justify Denial of Speedy
Trial, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 603, 608 (1971); Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA.
L. REV. 1587, 1601 (1965).
11. See Taylor, The Long Wait for a Speedy Trial, 80 CASE & COM. 3, 4 (1975); Note,
The Impact of Speedy Trial Provisions:A Tentative Appraisal, 8 COLUM. J.L. Soc. P. 356, 391
(1972); Note, Speedy Trial Schemes and Criminal Justice Delay, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 794,821
(1972).
12. See [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7402. Burger, The State of Judiciary-
1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 932 (1970). Contra, CLARKE, THE BAIL SYSTEM in CHARLOTTE [North
Carolina] 1971-1973, at 50 (1974).
13. See Smith v. United States, 418 F.2d 1120, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 936 (1969); 116 CONG. REC. 15888 (1970) (remarks of Senator Ervin); Note, 57 CORNELL
L. REV. 794, supra note 11, at 824.
14. SeeGodbold, Speedy Trial-Major Surgery for a National 111, 24 ALA. L. REV. 265,
265 (1972).
15. See SECOND CIRCUIT RULES REGARDING PROMPT DISPOSITION of CRIMINAL CASES,
28 U.S.C. App. (1976).
16. See Comment, Constitutional Right to a Speedy Trial: The Element of Prejudice and
the Burden of Proof, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 310, 317 (1971).
17. See note 176 and accompanying text infra.
2. Defendants' Interests.-Rule 1100 is a rule of criminal procedure
designed to implement and protect the defendant's constitutional right to a
speedy trial. Its particular terms are neither dictated nor defined by the
United States Constitution. 18 State courts and legislatures, however, are
free to afford greater protection to the interests traditionally subsumed in
the speedy trial right than is afforded by the constitutional guarantee.
Although the inclusion of extremely rigid standards in speedy trial provi-
sions may tend to abridge the defendant's constitutional rights in other
respects,' 9 rule 1100 instills a greater degree of objective certainty into
speedy trial determinations without sacrificing flexibility. It thus precludes
the trial of defendants who have been denied their sixth amendment rights
but have been unable to sustain the stringent burden of proof imposed by
the Barker test.2"
The sixth amendment has been construed as protecting the defend-
dant's right to be free from oppressive pretrial incarceration, to be free
from impairment of the ability to defend, and to be free from anxiety and
concern caused by prolonged subjection to pending criminal accusation.2i
The United States Supreme Court's approach to the speedy trial guarantee
may be conceptualized as a search for prejudice to the defendant in the form
of injury to these three interests. Delay impairing the accused's capacity to
defend detracts from the right to a fair trial and from the integrity of the
ultimate adjudication of criminal liability. Unreasonable pretrial detention
not only handicaps the investigatory efforts of the accused but is, together
with the anxiety and concern attendant to accusation, incompatible with the
presumption of innocence.22 Failure to consider these latter two interests
individually ignores the possibility that the claimant who has raised the
speedy trial issue may ultimately be acquitted. Although delay may on
occasion be advantageous to the defendant, 23 benefit to the accused should
18. Commonwealth v. Myrick, - Pa. -, 360 A.2d 598, 600_(1976).
19. See Comisky, Slow Justice is Preferable to Speedy Injustice, 44 PA. B.A.Q. 23, 24
(1972); Note, Criminal Law: Federal System Adopts Specific Parameters for the Constitu-
tionalRight to a Speedy Trial--Speedy TrialAct of 1974, 10 U. RICH. L. REV. 449,454 (1976).
20. See Comment, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 310, supra note 16, at 316. See also Rudstein, The
Right to a Speedy Trial: Barker v. Wingo in the Lower Courts, U. ILL. L.F. 11,41 (1975), in
which the author suggests that the imposition on the defendant of the burden of proof on the
prejudice issue has in effect been determinative of the speedy trial issue. Commentators have
argued persuasively that the requirement of proof of prejudice is unsupportable and should be
eliminated as a factor in the inquiry. E.g., Comment, The Speedy Trial Guarantee: Criteria
and Confusion in Interpreting Its Violation, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 839, 854-55 (1973); Note, 20
STAN. L. REV. 476 supra note 9, at 497; cf. Commonwealth v. Clark, 443 Pa. 318,333,279 A.2d
41, 49 (1971).
21. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966). Courts applying the Barker test
have consistently stressed the factor of impairment of defense and have de-emphasized the
prejudice resulting from the anxiety of accusation and pretrial incarceration. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Coffey, 230 Pa. Super. Ct. 49, 55, 331 A.2d 829, 833 (1974); Note, The
Constitutional Guarantee of Speedy Trial, 8 IND. L. REV. 414, 438 (1974). But cf. Moore v.
Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26-27 (1973) (prejudice to defense of trial is not essential to establish a
speedy trial claim).
22. Godbold, supra note 14, at 272.
23. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,521 (1972). See also Meyer, Effective Utilization
of Criminal Detainer Procedures, 61 IOWA L. REV. 659, 662 (1976); Note, Speedy Trials:
Recent Developments Concerning a Vital Right, 4 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 351, 353 (1976).
not be lightly inferred to defeat the defendant's rights, 24 particularly when
the defendant has not been released on bail or recognizance or is subject to
prolonged anxiety because of the outstanding charge. By establishing a
time limit beyond which the defendant is conclusively presumed to have
been prejudiced,25 rule 1100 obviates the necessity for ad hoc inquiries into
the issue of prejudice. Should the accused, however, suffer a prejudicial
delay within the allotted period or when the prompt trial rule is inappli-
cable, recourse to the sixth amendment is still available.
3. The Fragile Balance of Interests.-In the pivotal case Common-
wealth v. Hamilton26 the Pennsylvania court rejected the Barker test
because of its proven lack of success in eliminating criminal backlogs in
populous jurisdictions, its inherent vagueness, and its failure to ensure the
defendant's right to a speedy trial. 27 Furthermore, the court found the
existing statutory provisions 28 ineffectual in protecting the interests of
either society or criminal defendants.29 Pursuant to its rule-making
power,30 the court proposed a rule incorporating a mandatory time require-
ment intended to overcome the uncertainty of the Barker balancing process
and to protect more effectively the right of criminal defendants to a speedy
trial. 31 The court also suggested that not only the defendant's personal
24. The United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,531-32 (1972),
although cognizant that delay does not inexorably inure to the benefit of the accused, strongly
suggested that failure to assert the speedy trial right raises a presumption that the defendant
either did not desire prompt disposition or was not prejudiced by the delay. Thus the
defendant's burden to establish prejudice became even more oppressive.
25. Proof of a clear violation of the time limitation, even in the absence of a showing of
prejudice, suffices to support a petition for the dismissal of charges. See Commonwealth v.
Carter, 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 336, 339, 344 A.2d 648, 649 (1975). Consequently the prompt trial
rule avoids application of the Barkerbalancing test. Commonwealth v. O'Shea, - Pa. -, 350
A.2d 872, 874 n.6 (1976).
26. 449 Pa. 297, 297 A.2d 127 (1972).
27. Id. at 306, 297 A.2d at 131-32. Rule 1100, in contrast, is "intended both to reduce the
backlog of cases in the court of common pleas and to provide an objective standard for
protection of a defendant's right to a speedy trial." Commonwealth v. Mayfield, - Pa. -,
364 A.2d 1345, 1347 (1976).
28. The "two-term" rule, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 781 (Purdon 1964) admits an
incarcerated defendant to bail when trial has not ensued within two court terms of his arrest,
but does not preclude further prosecution. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Clark, 439 Pa. 192,
196,266 A.2d 741,744 (1970); Commonwealth v. Mancock, 375 Pa. 559, 562, 101 A.2d 728,730
(1954). Under the Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 881
(Purdon 1964) a defendant who has entered upon a term of imprisonment within the
Commonwealth pursuant to conviction is entitled to an order dismissing an outstanding
indictment with prejudice unless he is brought to trial within 180 days after providing written
notice to both the prosecutor and the court demanding disposition of outstanding charges. See
Commonwealth v. Wagner, 221 Pa. Super. Ct. 50, 54, 289 A.2d 210, 212 (1972); Common-
wealth v. Alger, 51 Pa. D. & C.2d 686,690 (C.P. Beaver 1971). This section does not apply to a
defendant held in custody pending trial. Commonwealth ex rel. DeMoss v. Cavell, 423 Pa. 597,
602,225 A.2d 673,675 (1967). A defendant may also petition for dismissal under PA. R. CRIM.
P. 316. This rule, however, retains the same uncertainty as the Barker four-factor test, since
the court must determine whether the filing of the indictment has been delayed unreasonably.
Commonwealth v. Kirk, 220 Pa. Super. Ct. 115, 119, 283 A.2d 712, 713 (1971). Before the
defendant is eligible for relief under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 1431 (Purdon 1964), the incarcerating jurisdiction must be a signatory to the
agreement. Commonwealth v. Wagner, 221 Pa. Super. Ct. 50, 55, 289 A.2d 210, 213 (1972).
29. 449 Pa. at 306, 297 A.2d at 131 (1,972).
30. PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c).
31. 449 Pa. at 306, 297 A.2d at 131(1972). The superior court has interpreted the prompt
trial rule proposed by the Hamilton court as "more a matter of procedural necessity for
fairness, rather than a constitutional mandate" and therefore not coterminous with the sixth
amendment guarantee. Commonwealth v. Pearson, 230 Pa. Super. Ct. 304,307,327 A.2d 167,
interest but also the societal interest in prompt disposition requires the
restraints of this rule. 32 Recently the court has acknowledged the Common-
wealth's interest in final adjudication of criminal proceedings and has
correspondingly limited the effectiveness of the stringent provisions of rule
1100. 32 Nonetheless, the influence of these interests on the interpretation
of the prompt trial rule and the impact of the rule in turn in diverse factual
contexts remain largely undefined.
B. Scope of Rule 1100 as Implemented by Pennsylvania Courts
The failure of the United States Supreme Court to articulate more
clearly the perimeters of the right to a speedy trial33 has permitted courts to
exercise great discretion in juggling the four factors. Generally the courts
have exercised this discretion to defeat the defendant's claim. 4 Because of
its inherent vagueness, the Barker test furnishes little guidance to either the
accused or the criminal justice system. 35 The definite36 but not inflexible
standards of rule 1100 lessen the need for defendants to revert to the
constitutional right and have thus become the primary basis in Pennsyl-
vania for speedy trial claims in prosecutions commenced subsequent to
June 30, 1973.37 Section (a)(2) of rule 1100 requires that "[tirial inacourt
case. . . commence no later than one hundred eighty (180) days from the
date on which the complaint is filed." As currently interpreted, the rule is
applicable to defendants residing in Pennsylvania as well as those incarcer-
ated in foreign jurisdictions, 37 a but is addressed only to the period within
which trials or new trials for indictable offenses must be held.
3s
1. Retrials and New Trials.-Section 1100(e) provides that "[a] new
trial shall commence within a period of one hundred twenty (120) days
after the entry of an order by the court or an appellate court granting a new
168 (1974). The time limits set forth in rule 1100 are definitive and not merely advisory.
Commonwealth v. Woods, - Pa. -, -, 336 A.2d 273, 274 (1975).
32. 449 Pa. 306, 297 A.2d 131 (1972).
32a. Commonwealth v. Shelton, - Pa. -, 364 A.2d 694 (1976).
33. Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a Fast Shuffle, 72 COLUM. L. REV.
1376, 1399 (1972).
34. Rudstein, supra note 20, at 58. See generally 3 W.ST. L. REV. 334, 340 (1976), in
which the writer in analyzing the rule adopted by the New York courts posits that a
balancing-of-factors approach introduces an inordinate number of contingencies, which
cause the potential for injustice and inequity to increase.
35. [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7405.
36. The sanctity of a 180 day limitation as the period between the filing of the complaint
and trial may be subject to question. It has been asserted that even more stringent time limits
do not impose an unreasonable burden on the criminal justice system. CompareTaylor, supra
note i1, at 6 with [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7407.
37. Pennsylvania courts are still processing a substantial number of cases in which
prosecution has antedated the effective date of rule 1100. E.g., Commonwealth v. Clark, -
Pa. Super. Ct. -, 361 A.2d 779 (1976).
37a. Defendants incarcerated outside Pennsylvania are to be accorded the same
procedural rights as Pennsylvania residents. Thus, the duty imposed on the Commonwealth
by rule 1100 to bring the accused to trial within the allotted period is not modified by his
incarceration elsewhere or by his failure to demand trial. Commonwealth v. McCafferty, -
Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 363 A.2d 1239, 1241 (1976). This decision in effect diminishes the
importance of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1431 (Purdon
1964), as a remedial device for the defendant.
38. The rule is inapposite to trials for summary offenses. Commonwealth v. Bush, 27
Bucks 139, 140 (Pa. C.P. 1975).
trial." ,39 The 120 day limit commences from the entry of the order for a new
trial rather than from the date on which the order granting the new trial was
finally adjudicated on appeal.' Lower courts have construed the new trial
provision of rule 1100 as contemplating the retrial of an accused whose
post trial motions have been sustained by the trial court or whose appeal
from sentence has been sustained. Under this interpretation the new trial
provision does not apply to a retrial following a mistrial. 41
Appellate courts have not opined whether retrials due to mistrials fall
within the purview of rule 1100, and if so, which provision of the rule
would control. The accused has already been brought to trial within the 180
or 270 day periods prescribed in sections 1 100(a)(1) and (a)(2)42 and has
conceivably exhausted the full measure of his benefits under these sec-
tions. Furthermore, if a retrial does not constitute a new trial as contem-
plated in section (e), then the defendant's only recourse is to the constitu-
tional guarantee. 43 Certainly it is untenable to suppose that the defendant
must be retried within 180 days of the filing of the complaint. In view of the
purposes of rule 1100, it is equally implausible to imagine that the time for
retrial should be totally unregulated save by the constitutional limitation.
The preferable approach would be a broader interpretation of section (e) or
the adoption of an analogous provision whereby a new time period would
commence with the declaration of a mistrial.
2. Preprosecution Delay.-The express language of rule 1100 affords
no remedy to the potential accused or to the convicted defendant awaiting
sentence. An individual becomes an accused entitled to the remedies
secured by the rule upon the filing of the complaint or upon the initiation of
prosecution by documents in lieu of a complaint."4 Although this is
consistent with the mandate that criminal proceedings in court cases shall
39. In the instance of new trials, the date pertinent to the determination of time
attachment is the date the order for a new trial was issued. Commonwealth v. Woods, 461 Pa.
255, 258, 336 A.2d 273, 274 (1975).
40. See Commonwealth v. O'Shea, -, Pa. -- 350 A.2d 872, 875 n.8 (1976).
41. Commonwealth v. Bilbee, 71 Pa. D. & C.2d31,34(C.P. Bucks 1975). Evidentiary
hearings ordered by an appellate court also do not constitute a new trial within the intent of the
prompt trial rule. Commonwealth v. Richman, 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 418,421,- A.2d -(1976).
42. Although section (a)(2) of rule 1100 requires that all cases initiated after June 30,
1974 must be tried within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, section (a)(l) provides for a
270 day period for prosecutions commenced between June 30, 1973 and July 1, 1974. The
latter section thus effectuates a transition period to accommodate exigencies arising from the
initial implementation of a mandatory time requirement. Commonwealth v. Mayfield, - Pa.
-, 364 A.2d 1345, 1347 (1976).
43. The court of common pleas in Commonwealth v. Bilbee, 71 Pa. D. & C.2d 31 (C.P.
Bucks 1975), having determined that the new trial provision does not apply to retrials
following mistrials, concluded that the sixth amendment constituted the sole protection of the
defendant's right to speedy trial during the period between the declaration of mistrial and the
retrial. In United States exrel. Wilcox v. Commonwealth, 302 F. Supp. 94 (E.D. Pa. 1969), the
court in construing the detainer statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 881 (Purdon 1964), reached asimilar conclusion. In neither case were the courts confronted with a delay in excess of 180
days between the declaration of mistrial and retrial; therefore, they did not decide whether a
second 180 day period should commence with the declaration of a mistrial.
44. Rule 1100 (Comment). The presentment of a grand jury is considered a document in
lieu of a complaint. In Commonwealth v. Silver, 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 221,225,357 A.2d 612,616
(1976), the court held that the submission to the indicting grand jury of apresentment, not the
issuance of a presentment by the investigating grand jury, triggers the running of the 180 day
period.
be instituted by either written complaint or arrest45 and with the prevailing
practice of initiating the majority of prosecutions by complaint, 6 it permits
the prosecuting authorities to circumvent the rule by postponing the
moment when the requirements of rule I 100 attach.47 Until arrest or formal
initiation of proceedings, the prospective defendant receives no protection
either from the constitutional speedy trial guarantee as articulated in United
States v. Marion48 or from the prompt trial rule. The duration of the
preprosecution period lies within the absolute control of the prosecution.
During this phase of the proceedings the only avenues of relief available, as
the law is currently interpreted, are the statute of limitations49 and the due
process clause,50 neither of which has proved to be of particular benefit to
the prospective defendant. 5' Consequently, the absence of any effective
supervisory control permits the prosecution not only to bypass rule 1100 by
a delayed filing of the complaint, but also to await a strategically advan-
tageous moment before permitting the time limitation to attach. Meanwhile
prospective defendants, ignorant of the investigatory efforts that have
focused on them, are unlikely to muster and preserve evidence for their
defense.
45. PA. R. CRIM. P. 101.
46. E.g., Commonwealth v. Bunter, 445 Pa. 413, 421, 282 A.2d 705, 708 (1971);
Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 443 Pa. 117, 130, 277 A.2d 764, 770 (1971).
47. The reluctance of the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee to extend rule 1100's
coverage to the preprosecution period may be attributed to the procedural nature of the rule
and its inapplicability when the judicial machinery has not been invoked. After the initiation
of formal proceedings by the lodging of a complaint, the matter becomes one of management
of the trial calendar and thus lies within the power and responsibility of the court. Common-
wealth v. Mayfield, - Pa. -, 364 A.2d 1345, 1347-48 (1976). The court during the preprosecu-
tion stage has only post hoc control over the progress of the case.
48. 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971). The Marion doctrine that speedy trial rights do not attach
prior to arrest or indictment was recently upheld and explained in Dillingham v. United States,
423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975). By not permitting the prospective accused to avail himself of the
speedy trial right during the preprosecution phase, the doctrine fails to acknowledge that
delays preceding arrest or formal charge may threaten the fact-finding process as much as, if
not more than, subsequent delays. Steinberg, Rights to Speedy Trial: Maintaining a Proper
Balance Between the Interests of Society and the Rights of theAccused, 4 U.C.L.A.-ALAS. L.
REV. 242, 257 (1974); Note, Justice Overdue: Speedy TrialforthePotentialDefendant, 5 STAN.
L. REV. 95, 100 (1952). Because the underlying purposes of the sixth amendment appear to
impose a duty on the prosecution to proceed expeditiously at all stages, it would be preferable
to require the initiation of criminal proceedings as soon as the decision to prosecute has been
made and sufficient evidence to secure an indictment has been compiled, even though this
may pose difficult problems of implementation. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 331-32
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Steinberg, Right to Speedy Trial: The Constitutional Right
and its Applicability to the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 66 J. CRIM. L. & C. 229, 237-38 (1975).
The basis for such a requirement may be discerned from Justice Brennan's reference in
Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30,44 (1970), to the approach adopted by the Court in Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964), to interpret the companion sixth amendment right to
counsel. It has therefore been argued that the relevant inquiry should be whether the
individual stands accused in the eyes of the government, and that the idiom "accused" in the
context of the sixth amendment relates merely to the issue of standing to assert the right to
speedy trial. Note, 20 STAN. L. REV. 476, supra note 9, at 490.
49. Commonwealth v. Cardonick, 448 Pa. 322, 333, 292 A.2d 402, 408 (1972).
50. See Commonwealth v. DeRose, 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 8,11,307 A.2d 425,427 (1973);
Comment, 22 DE PAUL L. REV. 839, supra note 20, at 863; Note, 20 STAN. L. REV. 476, supra
note 9, at 492-97. A defendant bringing a due process challenge must be able to establish that
he has suffered prejudice, show the manner in which the prejudicial delay has hampered his
ability to defend, and prove that the delay was an intentional prosecutorial device used to gain
tactical advantage. United States v. Frumento, 405 F. Supp. 23, 27 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
51. Cf., e.g., Commonwealth v. Butler, 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 283,331 A.2d 678 (1974), in
which the accused, realizing that his speedy trial claim would be rejected under the Marion
doctrine and apparently aware that an allegation of denial of due process would be difficult to
substantiate, attempted to present evidence at trial of a fifteen month delay between the date
3. Presentencing Delay.-The sixth amendment may be interpreted
as bestowing upon the accused not only a right to be brought to trial
speedily, but also a right to be accorded expeditious proceedings. For-
merly, Pennsylvania case law, without reference to the speedy trial right,
required that a defendant be sentenced within a "reasonable" time of
conviction.52 It has subsequently been recognized that, because sentence is
part of the trial, the constitutional right to a speedy trial may require the
timely sentencing of a defendant.53 The Pennsylvania courts have not,
however, conclusively determined that the right to a speedy trial incorpo-
rates the right to a timely sentence, even though many of the same
considerations that obtain when sentence has been delayed also apply when
trial has been delayed.54 In any event, dilatory sentencing is not a matter
within the language of rule 1100.
55
II. Exceptions to the Rule
A. Excluded Periods
A defendant may not avail himself of a delay that he has precipitated
and thereby obtain dismissal of the charge. Section (d) of rule 1100
provides for two distinguishable categories of defendant-caused delay that
automatically toll the prescribed period: delays caused by the unavailabil-
ity of either the accused or his counsel, and delays caused by continuances
requested by the defendant or his counsel .56 No other exclusions from the
computation of the mandatory period are recognized .51 Neither the unav-
of the offense and the date of arrest. The defendant chose this tactic on the chance that the
jury might infer that the failure to prosecute immediately demonstrated the weakness of the
case.
52. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Wilhelm v. Morgan, 278 Pa. 395, 397, 123 A. 337,
337 (1924).
53. Compare Commonwealth ex rel. Holly v. Ashe, 368 Pa. 211,219, 82 A.2d 244, 248
(1951) (dictum) with id. at 226, 82 A.2d at 251 (Stern, J., dissenting) and Commonwealth v.
Giovengo, 188 Pa. Super. Ct. 220, 228-29, 146 A.2d 629, 633 (1958) (Wright, J., dissenting). In
Commonwealth ex rel. Giovengo v. Maroney, 194 F. Supp. 154 (W.D. Pa. 1961), the court
conceded that the federal constitutional right may require timely sentencing, but declined to
predicate its decision on speedy trial grounds because the sixth amendment guarantee to
speedy trial had not yet been made applicable to the states. The court suggested that
Pennsylvania law as articulated in Commonwealth ex rel. Holly v. Ashe, 368 Pa. 211,82 A.2d
244 (1951), would permit consideration of the defendant's speedy trial claim in the instance of
delayed sentencing.
54. See Commonwealth v. Stewart, 221 Pa. Super. Ct. 1,7,289 A.2d 126,128-29(1972).
In a recent decision the court, having detected tacit acquiescence in the delay, held that a nine
month delay pending sentence violated neither the defendant's due process right nor his
speedy trial rights. Commonwealth v. Stouffer,- Pa. Super. Ct. -, 359 A.2d 829, 832 (1976).
Thus, although it did not invoke the tests generally employed to determine speedy trial claims
because of the waiver, the court implicitly acknowledged the applicability of the speedy trial
guarantee to deferred sentence cases.
55. Rule 1100 relates only to the period culminating in the commencement of trial.
Section (b) provides that "trial shall be deemed to commence on the date the trial judge calls
the case to trial."
56. Rule l100(d) provides:
In determining the period for the commencement of trial, there shall be excluded
therefrom such period of delay at any stage of the proceedings as results from:
(1) the unavailability of the defendant or his attorney; (2) any continuance in excess
of thirty (30) days granted at the request of the defendant or his attorney, provided
that only the period beyond the thirtieth day shall be so excluded.
57. See Commonwealth v. Shelton, - Pa. -, -,-364 A.2d 694, 698 (1976).
ailability of a codefendant nor that of a codefendant's counsel is chargeable
against the accused, unless it is shown that the accused agreed to the
delay.57 a Time consumed in the determination of pretrial motions, except a
motion for dismissal under rule 1100, is not to be excluded under either
provision,58 but may justify an extension upon timely application. 59
Therefore, the delay resulting from the defendant's motion for pretrial
discovery, though the subsequent determination may postpone the trial
date beyond the 180 day limit, does not render the defendant unavailable,
nor does it constitute a continuance within the intent of section (d). 60
1. Delay Attributable to the Unavailability of Defendant or Defense
Counsel.-The comment to rule 1100 enumerates particular instances in
which the accused must be deemed unavailable. As the comment suggests,
the prosecution cannot passively disclaim its duty of bringing the defendant
to trial during a period of apparent unavailability, but must exercise due
diligence in obtaining the defendant's presence. 61 Due diligence requires
use of the normal investigative procedures for establishing the whereabouts
of an accused and must be affirmatively demonstrated by the prosecution. 62
Moreover, the unavailability of the defendant must cause delay in the
criminal proceedings in question. An inadvertant delay caused, for exam-
ple, by a premature motion for dismissal under section (f) tolls the period if
it results in postponement of trial and if trial is commenced promptly upon
disposition of the motion. 63 Absent actual delay, the length of the interrup-
tion, even when it results from the defendant's intentional unavailability, is
immaterial. 64 Furthermore, the defendant's failure to appear at trial does
not toll the mandatory period, although it has occasioned a relisting of trial
57a. No burden is placed on the defendant to sever his trial so that proceedings can be
commenced within the time limits of rule 1100, nor is the defendant under a duty to dissociate
himself from delays caused by codefendants. Compare Commonwealth v. Brown, - Pa.
Super. Ct. -, 364 A.2d 330, 332 (1976) with Commonwealth v. Hagans, - Pa. Super. Ct. -,
364 A.2d 328, 330 (1976).
58. Commonwealth v. O'Shea, - Pa. -, -, 350 A.2d 872, 875 n.7 (1976); Common-
wealth v. Shelton, - Pa. Super. Ct. -,-,361 A.2d 873, 876 (1976), aff'd- Pa. -, 364 A.2d
694 (1976).
59. Commonwealth v. Shelton, - Pa. -, 364 A.2d 694 (1976).
60. Id.; Commonwealth v. Millhouse, - Pa. Super. Ct. -,-,362 A.2d 398,401(1976).
61. The comment to rule 1100 provides that
the defendant should be deemed unavailable for any period of time during which he
-could not be apprehended because his whereabouts were unknown and could not be
determined by due diligence; or during which he contested extradition or a
responding jurisdiction delayed or refused to grant extradition; or during which the
defendant was absent under compulsory process requiring his appearance
elsewhere in connection with other judicial proceedings.
Although the accused is deemed unavailable if extradition is contested, the accused is not
unavailable within the meaning of rule 1100 when the Commonwealth has made no effort to
obtain custody from a foreign jurisdiction. Commonwealth v. McCafferty, - Pa. Super. Ct.
-, 363 A.2d 1239, 1240 (1976).
62. See Commonwealth v. Keefer, 70 Pa. D. & C.2d 780,783-84 (C.P. Leb. 1974); ABA
SPEEDY TRIAL STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 2.3 & comment at 29.
63. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 508, 512, 362 A.2d 1005, 1008
(1976).
64. Commonwealth v. Millhouse, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 362 A.2d 398, 401 (1976);
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 357, 360, 352 A.2d 99, 101 (1975); Common-
wealth v. Cutillo, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 131, 135 n.3, 339 A.2d 123, 125 n.3 (1975). See generally
Comment, Implementation of Speedy Trial Guarantee in Louisiana, 33 LA. L. REV. 568, 577
(1973).
for a date subsequent to the expiration of the 180 day period, unless the
prosecution has diligently attempted to reschedule the trial within the
mandated 180 day period.65 The prosecutor's privilege to have a period of
delay excluded may also be waived by the failure to respond to allegations
in the defendant's pleadings that the defense is not chargeable with the
delay.
66
The indictment or conviction of a legally incompetent accused vio-
lates due process. 67 To protect the defendant's right to a fair trial, the court
may order a competency hearing and have the accused committed to an
appropriate facility for treatment if necessary. 68 Any delay of trial resulting
from the defendant's incompetence or from proceedings to determine
competence to stand trial is attributable to the unavailability of the
defendant and is correspondingly excluded from the period within which
trial must commence. 69 Delays of up to fifteen years have been counte-
nanced to effectuate the system of safeguards designed to protect an
incompetent accused.70 Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has recognized the possibility that an accused may still retain a valid speedy
trial claim under the sixth amendment even though his incompetence was
the sole cause of the delay. 71 If he should suffer prejudice during his
commitment, the prompt trial rule is of no benefit. Under these circum-
stances, recourse to the sixth amendment alone will effectuate the de-
fendant's right to a speedy trial.72
Unavailability to the defendant of his counsel does not automatically
warrant an exclusion under section (d)(1) of the rule. 73 The time period is
65. Commonwealth v. Bishop, 71 Pa. D. & C.2d 708, 710 (C.P. Montg. 1976).
66. Commonwealth v. Shelton, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 361 A.2d 873,876(1976), aff'd
- Pa. -, 364 A.2d 694 (1976); Commonwealth v. Eller, 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 99, 102,332 A.2d
507, 509 (1974).
67. Pate v: Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966).
68. Commonwealth v. McQuaid, - Pa. -, 347 A.2d 465, 474 (1975).
69. Commonwealth v..Reese, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 326, 330, 352 A.2d 143, 145 (1975);
ABA SPEEDY TRIAL STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 2.3(a).
70. Commonwealth v. McQuaid, - Pa. -, 347 A.2d 465 (1975) (15 year delay);
Commonwealth v. Ware, 459 Pa. 334, 329 A.2d 258 (1974) (43 month delay); Commonwealth
v. Reese, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 326, 352 A.2d 143 (1975) (118 day delay). The first two cited cases
addressed the constitutional guarantee and were not subject to rule 1100, but as indicated by
Reese, the same result follows under the rule. The Mental Health Procedures Act of July 9,
1976, No. 143, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7101-7503 (1976), should obviate extremely long
delays. The Act provides that a determination of competency must be rendered by the trial
court within twenty days after the receipt of the report of the competency examination.
Although under § 7403(b) a finding of incompetency will effect a stay of the prosecution for as
long as the incapacity persists, "[i]n no instance shall the proceedings be stayed for a period in
excess of the maximum sentence that may be imposed. . . or five years, whichever is less."
Id. § 7403(f).
71. Commonwealth v. McQuaid, - Pa. -, -, 347 A.2d 465,476 (1976). See generally
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 740-41 (1972); United States ex rel. Little v. Twomey, 477
F.2d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 1973).
72. While under rule 1100 the time period would recommence upon the discharge of the
accused from commitment, he could petition for the dismissal of the indictment under the
sixth amendment while still committed or immediately upon release. It is, however, unlikely
that the defendant's petition in the latter situation will be successful. "[W] here a principal
cause of postponement is the deliberate pace of the system of safeguards designed to protect
the accused, the courts have been exceedingly reluctant to find constitutional infirmity even-
in very long delays." Blunt v. United States, 404 F.2d 1283, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
73. See Commonwealth v. Adams, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 452, 456, 352 A.2d 97, 99 (1975)
(failure of counsel to communicate with the incarcerated defendant did not bring rule
not tolled under this provision unless the prosecution has established that
the unavailability of defense counsel has frustrated its attempts to bring the
accused to trial. 7" The time period will also not be tolled when counsel has
neglected to arrange for a preliminary hearing. 75 The defendant has no duty
to bring himself to trial, and the responsibility for scheduling this hearing
cannot be shifted to him. 76 Hence, the resulting period of delay is not
excludable when the magistrate has asked the defendant to advise his
attorney to arrange a date for the preliminary hearing and counsel has not
responded. 7 If the court decides to relist trial for a later date sua sponte
because of its cognizance of the scheduling difficulties of retained counsel,
the time period is tolled unless counsel has apprised the court of his
readiness to proceed to trial at a date within the allotted period. 7 A
distinction can be drawn, however, between retained and appointed
counsel. The time may continue to run when the prosecuting attorney has
failed to object to the appointment of counsel burdened with a substantial
trial backlog. 
79
2. Continuance at Defendant's Request.-Delay attributable to a
continuance requested or consented to by the accused is exempted from the
period within which trial must commence, but only to the extent that it
exceeds thirty days. 80 This general rule is further qualified by the holding in
Commonwealth v. Coleman1 that only the proportion of the delay will be
tolled that was "inevitably caused" by the defendant's request for a
continuance. 82 If the postponement immediately resulting from the con-
tinuance is prolonged by some intervening cause, the court must determine
whether the additional delay can be attributed to the defendant to permit
exclusion of the period. Were the additional delay primarily the result of
inefficient procedural measures, then only a pro rated portion of the delay
could be excluded, even though the scheduling difficulties would not have
been encountered but for the requested continuance. 83 If two periods of
delay should coincide, the periods are not tabulated separately, but are
computed so as to avoid duplicating the count.14
I 100(d)(i) into play because it did not prevent the prosecution from bringing the case to trial
within the time limits).
74. Id. at 457, 352 A.2d at 99.
75. Id. at 456, 352 A.2d at 99.
76. Compare id. with Commonwealth v. Wade, - Pa. Super. Ct. -- 360 A.2d 752,
753 (1976). See PA. R. CRIM. P. 140(f)(i).
77. Commonwealth v. Wade, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 360 A.2d 752, 753 (1976).
78. Commonwealth v. Reese, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 326, 331,352 A.2d 143,145-46(1975)
(defense counsel's having been scheduled to try another criminal case within several days of
the trial date in effect raised a rebuttable presumption of unavailability).
79. See generally Commonwealth v. Williams, 457 Pa. 502, 507, 327 A.2d 15, 18 (1974)
(the court analogized its duty to appoint counsel with its responsibility to control the trial
calendar).
80. Commonwealth v. Lewis, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 357, 330, 352 A.2d 99, 101 (1975). It is
questionable, however, whether a mere oral request by counsel for a continuance made out of
the presence of the accused will justify delaying trial for any extensive period and charging the
delay against the accused. Commonwealth v. Kaiser, 71 Pa. D. & C.2d 290, 294 (C.P. Lyc.
1975) (dictum).
81..-- Pa. , , 361 A.2d 870 (1976).
82. Id. at -, 361 A.2d at 872.
83. Id.
84. Commonwealth v. Zack, 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 210, 213, 357 A.2d 652, 654 (1976).
B. Time Extensions
1. Section (c): Prerequisites and Interpretative Difficulties.-Despite
the great vitality of continuances, it has been, recognized within the past
several years that extensive use of these dilatory tactics largely results from
a lack of diligence 85 and contravenes social policy. 86 Section (c) of rule
1100 reflects an awareness that while generally the need for prompt
disposition of criminal charges transcends the immediate interests of the
prosecution in postponing trial, this need for prompt disposition must be
tempered with a certain measure of flexibility. Section (c) provides,
At any time prior to the expiration of the period for com-
mencement of trial, the attorney for the Commonwealth may
apply to the courts for an order extending the time for com-
mencement of trial. A copy of such application shall be served
upon the defendant through his attorney, if any, and the defen-
dant shall also have a right to be heard thereon. Such application
shall be granted only if trial cannot be commenced within the
prescribed period despite due diligence by the Commonwealth. 7
This section goes beyond the requirement of a mere showing of "good
cause" for an extension and places an affirmative obligation of due
diligence on the prosecution. 88 The extension contemplated will neither
toll the 180 day limitation nor later renew its commencement. Rather, the
date for trial specified on the order granting the extension defines the new
limitation within which trial must commence.8 9 This section also provides
for notice to the accused and a right to be heard. Nevertheless, section (c)
poses the interpretative problem of construing "Commonwealth" and
"due diligence" as well as the enigma of what constitutes the optimal
degree of flexibility.
In conformance with the intent of the prompt trial rule as enunciated in
Commonwealth v. Hamilton9° Pennsylvania courts have held the pros-
ecutor to a strict standard and have granted extensions only in the most
urgent of circumstances. The rule makes no provision for granting exten-
sions nunc pro tunc when the Commonwealth has failed to petition within
the time limits. 91 To determine whether the petition was timely filed, the
85. Taylor, supra note 11, at 6.
86. ABA SPEEDY TRIAL STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 1.3 & comment at 13.
87. PA. R. CRIM. P. I I00(c).
88. The due diligence standard applies only to involuntary extensions; it is not operative
when the accused has consented to the extension. Commonwealth v. Myrick, - Pa. -, -,
360 A.2d, 598, 600 (1976). Though "due diligence" has not been defined by either the superior
or the supreme court, it is implicit in Commonwealth v. Mayfield, - Pa. -, 364 A.2d 1345
(1976), that due diligence requires the exercise of the "highest standards of professional
responsibility." Lower courts have determined that the failure to employ the normal
investigative procedures to locate the accused, Commonwealth v. Keefer, 70 Pa. D. & C.2d
780, 783-84 (C.P. Leb. 1974), and the failure to secure a prompt indictment preclude the
finding of due diligence, Commonwealth v. Brenner, 101 Montg. 185, 187 (Pa. C.P. 1976);
Commonwealth v. Freier, 101 Montg. 17, 19 (Pa. C.P. 1976); Commonwealth v. Kelly, 100
Montg. 430, 432 (Pa. C.P. 1976).
89. Commonwealth v. O'Shea, - Pa.-, 350 A.2d 872,875 (1976); Commonwealth v.
Walk, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 362 A.2d 378, 379 (1976).
90. 449 Pa. 297, 297 A.2d 127 (1972).
91. Commonwealth v. Shelton, - Pa. -, 364 A.2d 694 (1976). Commonwealth v.
Woods, 461 Pa. 255, 258, 336 A.2d 273, 274 (1975). Although the court in Commonwealth v.
Cutillo, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 131, 136, 339 A.2d 123, 125 (1975), seemed to allow that a showing
periods properly excludable under section (d) of the rule are deducted from
the total time elapsed from the filing of the complaint to the date of the
prosecutor's application. The petition is untimely when the computed time
exceeds the period mandated by rule 1100 for the commencement of trial. 92
2. Judicial Delays: Identification of Court and Commonwealth. -If
the prosecution, court and court administrator may be categorized together
under the rubric "Commonwealth," as suggested by the superior court in
Commonwealth v. Shelton,93 then the failure of any constituent element of
the Commonwealth to expedite criminal proceedings constitutes a lack of
due diligence within the intent of rule 1100, section (c). The basis for this
identification of state instrumentalities can be found in Barker v. Wingo.
94
In Barker the United States Supreme Court noted that ultimate responsibil-
ity for judicial delay must rest with the government. 9 It is to be expected
that the judiciary as an agency of the Commonwealth will be adequately
funded and will thus be able to properly exercise its inherent power to
control the trial calendar. 96 This surmise is implicit in Justice White's
statement that "unreasonable delay . . . cannot be justified by simply
asserting that the public resources . . . are limited and that each case must
await its turn." 97 The existence of congested trial dockets and inadequately
staffed projectors' and court administrators' offices is attributable primar-
ily to the relative priority accorded the operation of the criminal justice
process by the state legislature and to the administrative procedures of the
court. 98 Under the unitary interpretation, therefore, the existence of
of due diligence might justify a late petition when the delay is attributable to error in the court
admininistrator's office, the holding in Commonwealth v. Woods clearly rejects this proposi-
tion. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. O'Shea, - Pa. -, 350 A.2d 872,874 (1976), the supreme
court held that the prosecution is not privileged to excuse its failure to bring the accused to
trial within the specified period with evidence tending to show cause for an additional
extension.
92. Commonwealth v. Harris, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 366 A.2d 267, 269 (1976).
Commonwealth v. Shelton, - Pa. -, 364 A.2d 694, 697 (1976).
93. -Pa. Super. Ct.-,-, 361 A.2d873, 880(1976), aff'donothergrounds,-Pa.-,
364 A.2d 694 (1976); accord, Commonwealth v. Smith, - Pa. Super. Ct.-,-, 361 A.2d 862,
870 (1976) (Price & Spaeth, JJ., dissenting).
94. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
95. Id. at 531.
96. Judge Price has noted that the defendant may not be denied his right to a speedy trial
"however sympathetic [the court is] to the already heavy and oftentimes unrealistic demands
placed upon our court system." Commonwealth v. Smith, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 361 A.2d
862, 870 (Price & Spaeth, JJ., dissenting). These demands are not unrealistic in the sense that
defendants have acquired privileges to which they are not entitled, but rather because the
legislature has failed to appropriate resources to the judiciary commensurate with the
increased number of defendants processed annually in criminal court. Compare 2 GOVER-
NOR'S EXECUTIVE BUDGET 1976-1977, at 771; 2 GOVERNOR'S EXECUTIVE BUDGET 1975-1976, at
761; 1 GOVERNOR'S EXECUTIVE BUDGET 1974-1975, at 363; 1 GOVERNOR'S EXECUTIVE BUDGET
1973-1974, at 341; and I GOVERNOR'S EXECUTIVE BUDGET 1972-1973, at 293 with SUMMARY of
PENNSYLVANIA COURT DISPOSITIONS (1972-1975). An examination of these publications also
reveals that only four new judgships on the common pleas level have been created since 1972.
In contrast, Congress has expressed a willingness to allocate monies to implement the Speedy
Trial Act of 1974, [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7413, though it also has been reluctant
to increase judicial manpower. See Burger, State of the Judiciary-1975, 61 A.B.A.J. 439,
442-43 (1975).
97. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 538 (1972) (White, J., concurring). See generally
Uviller, supra note 33, at 1395-96.
98. See Note, 20 STAN. L. REV. 476, supra note 9, at 503.
calendar necessity is a product of the Commonwealth's lack of due
diligence and will not justify a time extension.
Though this identification of court and Commonwealth negates much
of the potential flexibility of the prompt trial rule, it is not inconsistent with
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's proposal in Commonwealth v. Hamil-
ton to formulate a rule "to more effectively protect the right of criminal
defendants to a speedy trial and to help eliminate the backlog in criminal
cases . . . . ,99 With this statement the court seemed to go beyond
imposing an affirmative duty on the prosecution by suggesting that it was
appropriate to expect a corresponding effort by the judiciary. The court
further asserted, "It is felt that a mandatory time requirement will act as a
stimulant to those entrusted with the responsibility of managing court
calendars." 100 Were all judicial delay a valid justification for time exten-
sion, rule 1100 would furnish little stimulus for the judicial system, the arm
of the state charged with the task of controlling the trial list. 10'
3. Judicial Delay and Prosecutorial Isolation.-By distinguishing
court and Commonwealth, Justice Eagen in Commonwealth v. Shelton
10 2
effectuated the prosecutorial isolation of section (c) rejected earlier by the
superior court: 
103
The "Commonwealth" in the context of the Rule clearly
refers to prosecutorial officers and not to the judiciary. Literally
read, the Rule quite simply does not attempt to solve the problem
of eliminating delay due to the judiciary; rather it attempts to
eliminate delay due to lack of due diligence on the part of
prosecutorial officers. 104
To rule otherwise, the Justice reasoned, would nullify the due diligence
exception embodied in section (c). It would leave the prosecutor remedi-
less when his office has exercised due diligence but trial cannot ensue
within the allotted period because of pretrial "judicial proceedings involv-
ing prosecution of the charges" or "scheduling difficulties or the like." 105
Nonetheless, the belated petition by the prosecution in Shelton did
show a lack of diligence. The sole issue determinative of the appeal was,
therefore, whether a delay precipitated by conflicting discovery orders tolls
the mandatory 180 day period. The prosecution's appeal to the supreme
court was defeated on two grounds: judicial delay is not an excluded
period under the provisions of the rule, and applications for extensions may
not be filed nunc pro tunc. The construction of the term Commonwealth in
99. 449 Pa. 297, 308, 297 A.2d 127, 133 (1972).
100. Id.
101. See generally Commonwealth v. Williams, 457 Pa. 502, 508-09, 327 A.2d 15, 18
(1974); ABA SPEEDY TRIAL STANDARDS, supra note 8, comment to § 2.3(b) at 27.
102. - Pa. -, 364 A.2d 694 (1976). The same distinction was drawn in Judge Watkins'
plurality opinion in Commonwealth v. Smith, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 361 A.2d 862, 866
(1976).
103. Commonwealth v. Shelton, -Pa. Super. Ct. -, 361 A.2d 873,879(1976) (dictum),
aff'd on other grounds, - Pa. -, 364 A.2d 694 (1976).
104. Commonwealth v. Shelton, - Pa. -, - 364 A.2d 694, 698 (1976).
105. Id. at -, 364 A.2d at 699.
section (c) was not essential to the resolution of the controversy, but was in
essence an advisory opinion intended to negate dictum in the lower court's
decision challenged by the prosecution. 1
06
While he predicated his opinion on a literal interpretation of section
(c), Justice Eagen never alluded to Commonwealth v. Hamilton, nor did he
consider the responsibility that the Hamilton court seemed to impose on the
trial court.107 Furthermore, he emphasized the distinction between the
constitutional speedy trial guarantee and the procedural requirements of the
prompt trial rule by acknowledging that the instant interpretation of rule
1100 did not completely protect the accused's right to a speedy trial. In
justification of judicial delay as a valid basis for time extensions, the Justice
placed great emphasis on the rights and interests of the Commonwealth in a
final adjudication of the charges'08 and on the right to be notified whether
the particular judicial delay warrants dismissal of the accused. 109 He did
not, however, totally forget the defendant's rights: as a final rationale he
suggested that permitting a time extension upon timely petition would
apprise the trial court of its own delay, and thereby prompt the court to
implement measures to expedite trial. Whether this is the form of stimulus
to the court envisioned in Hamilton'10 is certainly questionable.
The test for justifiable judicial delays was set forth in a companion
case decided the same day as Shelton. The issue that confronted the
supreme court in Commonwealth v. Mayfield' was whether judicial delay
ever permits a trial court to grant a time extension upon timely application
by the prosecution on the sole ground that the court cannot provide trial
within the prescribed period. To this the court responded:
Henceforth the trial court may grant an extension under rule
1100(c) only upon a record showing: (1) the "due diligence" of
the prosecution, and (2) certification that trial is scheduled for
the earliest day consistent with the court's business; provided
that if the delay is due to the court's inability to try the defendant
106. In Shelton the prosecution contended that the superior court's dictum substantially
impaired its "right" to effectuate a criminal prosecution. The court therefore engaged in its
interpretation of rule 1100(c) to "properly dispose of the Commonwealth's argument." - Pa.
-, -, 364 A.2d 694, 698 (1976).
107. 449 Pa. 297, 308-09, 297 A.2d 127, 132-33 (1972).
108. "[O]ur rule provides the Commonwealth with an adequate procedural method to
protect its right to [effectuate a prosecution] mainly by obtaining time extensions under
Section (c) of the rule .... Commonwealth v. Shelton, - Pa. -, -, 364 A.2d 694, 699
(1976), citing Commonwealth v. O'Shea, - Pa. -, -, 350 A.2d 872, 875 (1976) (material
bracketed in Shelton opinion). It should be noted that in this excerpt the O'Shea court was not
discussing the right to effectuate prosecution, but rather the Commonwealth's right to appeal.
109. The court evidenced a primary concern for whether judicial delay would warrant an
extension under rule 1100(c) or an exclusion under section (d):
If we were to rule 'judicial delay' constitutes an implied exclusion, the Common-
wealth would have to run the risk of dismissal in each and every case where 'judicial
delay' was involved because whether or not an exclusion is justified is determined
after the accused's application for dismissal is filed. Under our ruling today, the
Commonwealth will not have to run that risk because it will be provided with a
ruling on whether the 'judicial delay' justifies an extension prior to the mandatory
period expiring.
Commonwealth v. Saielton, - Pa. -, 364 A.2d 694, 699 (1976).
110. 449 Pa. 297, 308, 297 A.2d 127, 133 (1976). See notes 99, 100and accompanying text
supra.
IIl. -- Pa. -, 364 A.2d 1345 (1976).
within the prescribed period, the record must also show the
causes of the delay and the reasons why the delay cannot be
a voided. 112
Thus the court did not broadly endorse time extensions predicated upon
judicial delay; rather it placed a substantial burden upon trial courts to
implement the objectives of rule 1100 with due diligence. Thereby the
court affirmed that "unwarranted" grants of extensions would not be
countenanced, though it did not furnish objective guidelines for distin-
guishing warranted from unwarranted grants.
A precise distinction was not drawn, perhaps because it was not
essential to the issue in Mayfield: the prosecution had certified its prepared-
ness for trial on the day the indictment was returned; the record disclosed
no lack of diligence on the part of the court; and trial commenced within
several days of the 180 day period. 1 13 The opinion does suggest that the
court's lack of diligence would defeat an application for an extension even
though the prosecution has proceeded diligently. This implication may be
adduced from the following passages:
This court has expressly recognized the need to encourage
trial courts . . . to act promptly in criminal cases.1
14
This court is aware that, despite diligent efforts by the trial
courts, cases may arise when a trial of a defendant cannot be held
within the prescribed period. In such circumstances, the policies
which prompted the adoption of rule 1100 would not be served by
disallowing a reasonable limited extension specifying ' "the date
or period within which trial shall be commenced.'' 15
There is nothing in this record to indicate that the cause of
delay was due to lack of diligence on the part of the trial court.
The granting of the extension under rule 1100(c) was therefore
appropriate in the circumstances of this case. 116
[W]e need to insure that trial courts exercise due diligence in
implementing the objectives of rule 1100. We do not expect and
will not permit the rule to be circumvented by unwarranted
grants of extensions.117
This Court therefore expects our trial courts, as well as
counsel for defense and prosecution, to exercise the highest
standards of professional responsibility in order to implement
rule 1100's mission of speedy trials." t8
The Mayfield opinion thus clearly holds that due diligence is the most
that can be demanded of the prosecution. It further suggests that trial within
112. Id. at -, 364 A.2d at 1349-50 (emphasis added).
113. The factual setting of this case was unprecedented in the brief history of rule 1100.
In no prior case had the prosecution certified its readiness for trial and petitioned for an
extension within the prescribed period. See Commonwealth v. Mayfield, -Pa. Super. Ct. -,
-, 362 A.2d 994, 997 (1976) (Jacobs, Watkins & Van der Voort, JJ., dissenting), rev'd, - Pa.
-, 364 A.2d 1364 (1976).
114. - Pa. -- , 364 A.2d 1345, 1348 (1976).
115. Id. at-, 364 A.2d at 1348.
116. Id. at-, 364 A.2d at 1349.
117. Id. at-, 364 A.2d at 1349.
118. Id. at-, 364 A.2d at 1349.
the regular course of court procedure does not fully comport with the
purposes of rule 1100; rather, trial courts must be encouraged to act
promptly to reduce backlogs in criminal cases. In citing both Barker v.
Wingo"1 9 and the ABA Speedy Trial Standards, 120 the court indicated that
extensions because of court congestion are not regarded favorably. The
requirement that courts act responsibly to discharge their obligation to
manage court calendars 121 is central to the supreme court's ultimate
conclusion that the record must show a certification that trial commenced at
the earliest date consistent with the court's business. The court's business
in turn is "to exercise the highest standards of professional responsibility to
implement rule 1100's mission of speedy trials."1 22 By further requiring
that the trial record disclose the causes of court delay and the reasons why
delay cannot be avoided, the supreme court fashioned a mechanism for the
preclusion of arbitrary extensions and the preservation of the rule 1 100(c)
issue for appellate review.
The Shelton and Mayfield opinions differ substantially. While Justice
Eagen in Shelton disavowed any purpose in rule 1100 to minimize judicial
delay123 and paid little heed to the policies underlying the rule, Justice
Roberts' opinion in Mayfield construed section (c) in the context of the
reasons articulated in Commonwealth v. Hamilton for rejecting the Barker
test. 124 Justice Roberts discerned the following policies advanced by rule
1100: the need for an objective standard for the protection of the defend-
ant's right to speedy trial; the need for reduction of the backlog of cases in
courts of common pleas; the responsibility of trial courts to act expedi-
tiously in criminal cases and to properly manage the criminal calendar; the
undesirability of automatically granting extensions merely because of
judicial delay; and the overriding public interest in the prompt trial of the
criminally accused. The Mayfield approach is clearly preferable to that
adopted by Justice Eagen from interpretative, policy, and constitutional
perspectives, and it presumably represents the current law in Pennsyl-
vania. 125 Its principal deficiency is the condonation of time extensions
when delay is attributable to congested dockets.' 26 Furthermore, it is not
119. 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972).
120. ABA SPEEDY TRIAL STANDARDS, supra note 8, comment to § 1.1 at 11, comment to §
2.3(b) at 27-28.
121. Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297, 308, 297 A.2d 127, 133 (1972); cf.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 457 Pa. 502, 508-09, 327 A.2d 15, 18 (1975); Commonwealth v.
Dipasquale, 431 Pa. 536, 541, 246 A.2d 430, 432 (1968).
122. - Pa. -, -, 364 A.2d 1345, 1349 (1976).
123. See generally notes 102-04 and accompanying text supra.
124. Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297, 306-09, 297 A.2d 129, 131-33 (1972).
125. The discussion of the relationship between judicial delay was only a peripheral
matter in Shelton and was not central to the disposition of the appeal. Because the prosecu-
tion's application for an extension was untimely, it was unnecessary to define what would
constitute a justifiable basis for the granting of an application for a time extension. In
contrast, the court in Mayfield was confronted with a timely petition. Its determination that
judicial delay would warrant a time extension was dispositive of the case and should therefore
be accorded greater precedential value than the corresponding discussion in Shelton.
126. The court in Commonwealth v. Mayfield, - Pa. -, 364 A.2d 1345 (1976), held that
the delay in controversy justified a time extension. The opinion does not set forth the cause of
the court delay nor does it explain why the delay could not have been averted, thus leading to
clear from the opinion which party is charged with the burden of establish-
ing the presence or absence of diligence on the part of the court.
4. Judicial Delay from the Defendant's Perspective.-The Mayfield
decision is pragmatically justifiable if one accepts the proposition that the
prosecutor has little control over judicial delays and should not be punished
because of their occurrence. Moreover, the final release of an accused
merely because of an overcrowded court's inability to schedule trial may
result in discharges en masse, an erosion of public confidence in the
criminal justice system, and a diminution of any deterrent effect of criminal
proceedings. Perhaps rule 1100 should be interpreted to require no more
than trial within the due course of court procedure, thus protecting the
interests of the prosecuting authority as suggested in Shelton. This conclu-
sion conflicts seriously with the reasons for the repudiation of the Barker
test and the promulgation of the rule: the elimination of criminal backlogs
and the preservation of the defendant's speedy trial rights. 27 Although the
Mayfield interpretation instills a measure of flexibility into the rule that it
previously lacked, it does so unfortunately at the expense of the accused,
the central character in the drama. Ultimately, it is illogical to differentiate
the causes of delay as long as they are preventable and not attributable to
the defendant. 2 8 If the court is unable to schedule trial within the time
prescribed because of the manner in which trial terms or sessions are
arranged, it should be obliged to change its procedures. 2 9 Delay resulting
from court congestion may be unavoidable in the particular instance, but it
is not an irremediable component of the criminal justice system. '130
Contrary to Justice Eagen's contention in Commonwealth v. Shelton,
the due diligence exception in rule 1100(c) is not rendered devoid of all
meaning if court congestion does not merit a continuance. If a prevalent
purpose of the prompt trial rule is to promote the public interest by
improving the efficiency of criminal prosecutions,' 31 it would be reason-
able to grant a time extension when the accused's defense will not be
the conclusion that the mere inability of the court administrator to schedule trial within the 180
day period was an adequate reason for an extension. The opinion noted that no lack of
diligence was apparent from the record but failed to indicate whether the delay could have
been prevented by modifications in the scheduling procedures.
127. Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297, 308, 297 A.2d 127, 133 (1972).
128. See ABA SPEEDY TRIAL STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 2.3(b) & comment at 27, in
which it is proposed that court congestion not be considered an exceptional circumstance
warranting additional time.
129. Commonwealth v. Coleman, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 361 A.2d 870, 872 (1976).
130. Rule 1100 as it was construed prior to the supreme court decisions in Shelton and
Mayfield had a significant impact upon trial court procedures. For example, while the
Montgomery County Common Pleas Court granted extensions to the prosecution in approxi-
mately 90% of its criminal cases because of crowded dockets, this practice was largely
attributable to the court's hearing criminal cases only 24 weeks a year. Since the beginning of
1976, the court has been prompted to try cases 48 weeks a year. Similarly, the Philadelphia
courts have instituted a "fail-safe" system whereby a case approaching the 180 day limit will
be pushed ahead of others to avoid dismissal. Both practices are consequences of superior
court decisions that judicial delay and court congestion will not warrant an extension.
Philadelphia Inquirer, May 10, 1976, § B, at I. Nevertheless, the impetus to continue these
procedural modifications and to generate other solutions to the crowded docket problem has
been effectively eroded by the state supreme court.
131. See notes 7-16 and accompanying text supra.
impaired thereby and when through no fault of the Commonwealth as a
unified body neither the court nor the prosecution is able to proceed to trial
within the mandatory period. 32 Thus, delay resulting from pretrial pro-
ceedings (e.g., pretrial hearings on motions) warrants an extension. 133 An
extension will be in order when the extreme complexity of a case has
hampered the prosecution's preparation for trial 134 or when some excep-
tional circumstance has congested the court with a plethora of cases. 135 An
order granting an extension to protect the Commonwealth's right to appeal
also comports with the purposes of rule 1100.136 Were no provision made
for delays of this nature, rule 1100 would become an overwhelming
offensive weapon in the hands of an astute defendant rather than the
prophylactic measure it was intended to be. Under no circumstances,
however, should an extension be granted for judicial delay unless it has
been certified that the cause of delay was unpreventable despite the
exercise of due diligence. 
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5. Alternative Approaches to Judicial Delay.- Various alternatives
are available to a court confronted with the problem of reconciling court
congestion and judicial delay with a prompt trial provision. The court may
ignore delays resulting from congestion by attacking only prosecutorial
delay. The effect of this approach would be the creation of a "ready"
rule' 38 under which a showing of preparedness by the prosecution within
the mandatory time limits would suffice to abridge the defendant's speedy
trial claim. It would compel the courts to promulgate a standard of
132. See Commonwealth v. Shelton, - Pa. Super. Ct. - , -  361 A.2d 873, 880 (1976)
(Van der Voort, Watkins & Jacobs, JJ., dissenting), aff'd, - Pa. -, 364 A.2d 694 (1976);
Commonwealth v. Smith, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 361 A.2d 862, 867 (1976) (Cercone, J.,
concurring).
133. Commonwealth v. O'Shea, - Pa. -, 350 A.2d 872, 875 n.7 (1976).
134. See ABA SPEEDY TRIAL STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 2.3(d)(ii) & comment at 29. See
generally United States v. Bergdoll, 412 F. Supp. 1308, 1321 (D. Del. 1976). The discrimina-
tory treatment of cases because of the nature of the charge was also sanctioned by the United
States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972).
135. ABA SPEEDY TRIAL STANDARDS, supra note 8. § 2.3(b) & comment at 28.
136. Commonwealth v. O'Shea, - Pa. -, -, 350 A.2d 872, 875 n.l (1976). The court
noted, however, that the defendant's right to a speedy trial and the need for proper judicial
administration justify "any limitation on the Commonwealth's right appeal." Id. at -, 350
A.2d at 875 n.8.
137. Under this theory court congestion would generally not qualify as a valid justifica-
tion for a time extension:
To be sure, proof only that the court's dockets are overcrowded will not constitute
due diligence, since Rule 1100 contemplates that the accused should not suffer from
general inadequacies in the criminal justice system. From time to time, however, an
administrative quirk may arise and frustrate the Commonwealth's attempt to begin
trial within the period allowed under the Rule. Upon proof of such a peculiar
circumstance by the district attorney, the hearing court in its discretion may well
determine that due diligence was shown and grant a modest extension.
Commonwealth v. Smith, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 361 A.2d 862, 867 (1976) (Cercone, J.,
concurring).
138. Rules of this nature have been adopted by the New York Legislature, N.Y. CRIM. P.
LAW, § 30.30, and by the United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 28 U.S.C. App.
(1976). These rules have been criticized because they do not solve the fundamental difficulties
presented by judicial delay, but instead defer confrontation. See Uviller, supra note 33, at
1397; Comment, Speedy Trials and the Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition of
Criminal Cases, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1074 (1971). These rules also permit the prosecution
to claim preparedness, knowing that the court may be unable to challenge. Note, 8 COLUM. J.
L. Soc. P. 356, supra note 11, at 385.
readiness to be applied in an ad hoc manner and thereby detract from the
attribute of certainty that currently characterizes rule 1100., 39 Moreover, it
could hardly stimulate those entrusted with the responsibility of managing
court calendars. 140 But, most importantly, it would leave an accused who
sincerely desires a speedy trial without remedy unless the accused can
successfully pursue a speedy trial claim under the Barker standards.
The court could also adopt shortcuts in criminal procedure. This,
however, may threaten a defendant's other constitutional rights. Modifica-
tion of current procedures to achieve a more efficient judicial system is
necessary, but must be indulged in cautiously so as not to violate the rights
of the individual sought to be protected by those procedures. 141 Failure to
make changes essential to the expeditious conduct of criminal proceedings
should not be permitted to subvert the purposes of the prompt trial rule. The
imposition of a duty to implement improvements calculated to eliminate
delay comports with the mandate in Mayfield that the trial courts exercise
the "highest standards of professional responsibility in order to implement
rule 1100's mission of speedy trials." 142 If the delay is not attributable to
the defendant or to defense counsel, the court should determine not only
whether the delay could have been avoided, but also whether its cause
could have been prevented by the exercise of due diligence. Since one of
the objectives of the prompt trial rule is the elimination of the backlog of
criminal cases, this backlog cannot serve as a justification for a time
extension. Thus, a court should not grant an extension merely because of a
crowded docket without further inquiry into the causes of congestion.
Finally, the court could order the discharge of an accused who through
no fault of his own is not brought to trial within the time limits. The latter
course, though it may benefit both court administration and the accused,
has been dreaded because of its inflexibility and because of its potential to
occasion mass dismissals. 43 Dismissal because of judicial delay
139. See notes 33-36 and accompanying text supra; Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa.
297, 308-09, 297 A.2d 127, 132-33 (1972).
140. See Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297, 308, 297 A.2d 127, 133 (1972).
141. See Commonwealth v. Ware, 459 Pa. 334, 335, 329 A.2d 258, 263 (1974). See
generally Comisky, supra note 14, at 26. Suggested modifications include the adherence to
rigid trial schedules, the expansion of criminal discovery, the improvement of jury selection,
the implementation of preprosecution probation plans, and the elimination of indicting grand
juries. See Campbell, Delays in Criminal Cases, 55 F.R.D. 229 (1972).
142. - Pa. -, -, 364 A.2d 1345, 1349 (1976).
143. It has been asserted that a rigid speedy trial provision will cause the accused to wait
out the prescribed period wagering that the case will be dismissed. A corresponding decrease
in guilty pleas would accompany an increase in dismissals. See 8 COLUM. J. L. Soc. P. 356,
supra note 11, at 378. This argument has been discounted on the one hand because the guilty
plea is not a totally positive phenomenon, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7412, and on
the other hand because the guilty plea may be more attractive to a defendant than the peril of
an eventual trial conviction. 8 COLUM. J. L. Soc. P. 356, supra note II, at 384. Furthermore, in
Pennsylvania, the ratio of dispositions by guilty plea to total dispositions has not decreased
dramatically since the adoption of rule 1100. While guilty pleas and dismissals respectively
constituted 36.4% and 26.1% of total dispositions in 1972, the percentage of guilty pleas
decreased to 32. 1% and the number of dismissals increased to 28.8% of total dispositions in
1975. It is noteworthy, however, that the percentage of guilty pleas increased and the
percentage of dismissals decreased between 1974 and 1975. See SUMMARY OF PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL COURT DISPOSITIONS (1972-1975). Contra, Philadelphia Inquirer, May 10, 1976, § B,
at 1. Nonetheless, the spectre of mass dismissals raised during oral argument must have had a
may provide the defendant with a windfall discharge; but that
was the very result contemplated [by the Hamilton court]. Under
Rule 1100, it is the responsibility of those who administer the
court system to guarantee that criminal trials take place within
the prescribed periods.'44
Currently the state of the law in Pennsylvania is that judicial delay
may warrant a time extension,' 45 but it will not toll the 180 day period
within which trial must commence. 146 Time extensions should be granted
sparingly, since none of the consequences of the delay are mitigated merely
because it was occasioned and sanctioned by the court rather than by the
prosecutor. Furthermore, the express purposes of rule 1100 include the
expedition of criminal proceedings by the imposition of an affirmative duty
upon the court 14 1 that cannot be deferred to the prosecution.
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C. Withdrawal of Prosecution
1. Nolle Prosequi.-The procedural device of nolle prosequi presents
a significant menace to the defendant's interest in prompt disposition of
outstanding charges. The practice connotes a "[violuntary withdrawal by
the prosecuting attorney of present proceedings on a particular bill";
149
that is, an indefinite suspension of proceedings at the will of the prosecutor.
Although at common law the prosecution enjoyed vast discretion in
determining whether a case should be nolle prossed, the legislature, in an
attempt to restrict the potential for oppressive application, has conditioned
the entry of a nolle prosequi on judicial approval. 150 The Commonwealth
may nolle pros any count of an indictment whenever the prosecutor deems
it appropriate and judicial assent has been obtained, notwithstanding the
objection of the accused. 5 The current rule is that the grant or refusal of a
significant impact on the supreme court's decision in Commonwealth v. Mayfield, - Pa. -,
364 A.2d 1345 (1976), to limit the applicability of the purposive basis of rule 1100 enunciated in
Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297, 308, 297 A.2d 127, 133 (1972). See The Philadelphia
Inquirer, June 23, 1976, § B, for a vivid account of this session of oral argument.
144. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 508, 518, 362 A.2d 1005, 1011
(1976) (Hoffman, Cercone, Spaeth, JJ., dissenting).
145. Commonwealth v. Mayfield, - Pa. -, 364 A.2d 1345 (1976).
146. Commonwealth v. Shelton, - Pa. -, 364 A.2d 694 (1976).
147. See Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297, 308, 297 A.2d 127, 133 (1972).
148. Commonwealth v. Williams, 457 Pa. 502, 509, 327 A.2d 15, 18 (1974), bears
testimony to the possible consequences of the court's abdication of its duty to control the trial
calendar. The assistant district attorney assigned to the case testified, "We wanted to take the
easier cases, so we just simply put the homicides aside and we didn't even discuss them
.... Thus the defendant's case was not even considered for more than two years.
149. Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 293 Pa. 218, 223, 142 A. 213, 216 (1928); accord,
Commonwealth v. Shields, 89 Pa. Super. Ct. 266, 268 (1926).
150. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §492 (Purdon 1964). See generallyKlopfer v. North Carolina,
386 U.S. 213, 215 (1967). To obtain judicial approval the prosecution must offer justification
for the delay, establish that the defendant's speedy trial rights will not be violated and
demonstrate that the delay will not frustrate the efficient administration of justice. Compare
Commonwealth v. Gant, 213 Pa. Super. Ct. 427, 432, 249 A.2d 845, 847 (1969) with
Commonwealth v. DiPasquale, 431 Pa. 536, 541, 246 A.2d 430,432 (1968). This requirement
conforms with the ABA SPEEDY TRIAL STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 2.3.
151. Commonwealth v. Lord, 230 Pa. Super. Ct. 96, 101 n.3,326A.2d 455,458 n.3 (1974);
Commonwealth v. Blatt, 13 Bucks 437, 440-41 (Pa. C.P. 1963). PA. R. CRIM. P. 314 provides,
"Upon application of the attorney for the Commonwealth, the court may, in open court, order
a nolle prosequi notwithstanding the objection of any person." The "notwithstanding the
objection of any person" clause has been interpreted to signify that a defendant does not have
nolle prosequi lies within the sound discretion of the court, 152 as does its
subsequent revocation, 153 and the court's action will not be reversed in the
absence of an abuse of discretion. 1
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If the trial court finds that the grant of a nolle prosequi would deny the
accused his right to a speedy trial, it may order the parties to proceed to
trial. 155 Failure of the accused to contest the petition to nolle pros, while not
interpreted as an automatic waiver of his constitutional rights, has been
construed as an indication that he did not want a speedy trial. 56 Although
an. indefinite suspension of charges might initially appeal to the accused
causing him to not challenge the petition, he still remains tainted in the
public eye and can be fully vindicated only by acquittal or dismissal of the
charges. Once a nolle pros has been entered, the accused, who is still
presumptively innocent, finds himself in the unenviable situation of
bearing the burden of the pending charges and being unable to compel the
prosecution to vacate the nolle pros and conclusively dispose of the
charges. Justice Nix, dissenting in Commonwealth v. Reinhart,157 per-
ceived this effect of the nolle pros but treated it as a problem of due process
rather than speedy trial:
Where a system permits the defendant's reputation to be sullied
and stained through the government's virtually unfettered right
to initiate prosecution, that system must also provide the person
charged with an adequate opportunity for exoneration where the
charges rove to be unwarranted or incapable of substan-tiation. 15P
This need for an opportunity for vindication underlies the speedy trial
analysis in Klopfer v. North Carolina'59 and militates against an inference
that the defendant no longer desires a prompt trial. An adequate opportu-
nity for exoneration necessarily entails prompt disposition of outstanding
charges.
in Commonwealth v. Reinhart'6° the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
endorsed the prosecution's tactical maneuver of postponing trial to obtain
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case by holding that the
refusal of a Commonwealth witness to testify constitutes a valid basis for
some trial delay. The court was, however, not confronted with rule 1100,
an absolute right to be tried on demand. It does not preclude argument on the merits of the
petition, nor does it direct the court to ignore the defendant's objections. On the basis of this
interpretation, the constitutionality of rule 314 has been upheld. See Commonwealth v.
Reinhart, - Pa. -, -, 353 A.2d 848, 851-52 (1976).
152. Commonwealth v. DiPasquale, 431 Pa. 536, 541, 246 A.2d 430, 432 (1968).
153. Commonwealth ex rel. Thor v. Ashe, 138 Pa. Super. Ct. 222, 227, 11 A.2d 173, 175
(1940). The procedural safeguard of court approval prior to the vacation of the nolle prosequi
does not foreclose inquiry into the speedy trial issue. See Commonwealth v. Gant, 213 Pa.
Super. Ct. 427, 430, 249 A.2d 845, 846 (1969).
154. Commonwealth v. Reinhart, - Pa. -, -, 353 A.2d 848, 853 (1976).
155. Commonwealth v. DiPasquale, 431 Pa. 536, 540-41, 296 A.2d 430, 432 (1968).
156. Commonwealth v. Ware, 459 Pa. 334, 349-50, 329 A.2d 258, 266 (1974).
157. - Pa. -, 353 A.2d 848 (1976).
158. Id. at -, 353 A.2d at 854 (Nix, J., dissenting).
159. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
160. - Pa. -, 353 A.2d 848 (1976).
nor did it address whether the Commonwealth could reprosecute the
appellant. The court subsequently encountered these issues in Common-
wealth v. Whitaker.16' In Whitaker the prosecution contended that the
entry of a nolle prosequi with judicial assent tolled the running of the rule
1100 time period so long as the speedy trial rights of the defendant as
defined in Barker had not been violated and the statute of limitations had
not expired. In response, the court stated categorically that the Barker
standard is an inadequate safeguard and that the test mandated by the
prompt trial rule is the sole gauge by which to assess speedy trial claims. 1
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Perhaps influenced by the prosecution's failure to petition for the entry of a
nolle pros order until two days prior to the expiration of the period, the
court noted that the nolle pros device was invoked merely as an expedient
to obtain a time extension without complying with section (C) 163 and to
frustrate the purposes of the prompt trial rule while avoiding the harsh
consequences of its violation. 64 The accused's motion for dismissal of all
charges with prejudice was therefore granted.
Prosecutors have become fond of the stratagem of nolle prossing cases
since the prompt trial rule became effective. 165 By depriving the prosecu-
tion of this means of circumventing the rigors of rule 1100, the state
supreme court has in effect checked the procedure of filing a complaint and
thereafter suspending prosecution indefinitely. The court did not hold that
a nolle pros may not be entered when the prosecution lacks sufficient
admissible evidence to obtain a conviction, but only that this practice will
not be permitted to. violate the defendant's right to a prompt trial as
delineated in rule 1100. 166 Thus, a nolle pros order does not toll the running
of the prescribed period.
2. Dismissal of the Complaint.-A somewhat analogous situation
arises when the complaint has been dismissed and refiled. The issue in this
context is one of time attachment: should the 180 day period commence
with the filing of the original complaint or with the complaint under which
the accused presently stands charged? 167 No unequivocal answer to this
query has yet emerged, although the same rationale is apposite as in the
161. - Pa. -, 359 A.2d 174 (1976); see 81 DICK. L. REV. 387 (1977).
162. Id. at -, 359 A.2d at 176.
163. Id. at -, 359 A.2d at 177.
164. Id. at -, 359 A.2d at 176; accord, ABA SPEEDY TRIAL STANDARDS, supra note 8,
comment to § 4.1 at 40-41.
165. Statistics compiled by the Governor's Justice Commission and published in the
respective yearly editions of PENNSYLVANIA CRIMINAL COURT DISPOSITIONS indicate that of
the total number of criminal cases processed in the state's three most populous counties
(Allegheny, Montgomery and Philadelphia) 4.97% were nolle prossed in 1972, 6.44% were
nolle prossed in 1973, 14.96% were nolle prossed in 1974 and 11.84% were nolle prossed in
1975. (Rule 1100 became effective July I, 1973.)
166. - Pa. at -, 359 A.2d at 175-76.
167. A further question of time attachment has not yet been addressed by the Pennsyl-
vania courts in their interpretation of rule 1100: May the prosecutor file the charges emanating
from the incident in controversy seriatim? In United States v. Small, 345 F. Supp. 1246, 1249
(E.D. Pa. 1972), the court reasoned that since one can become an accused for sixth
amendment purposes by arrest and because at arrest there are no formal charges outstanding,
the right to a speedy trial must attach to all charges inherent in the incident giving rise to the
arrest. The provisions of rule 1100, in contrast, become applicable at the moment a specific
instance of a nolle pros order. While dismissal of the complaint may
temporarily suspend the impending cloud of accusation, the defendant is
subjected to an indefinite period of uncertainty and anxiety if the prosecu-
tion is permitted to determine when it will be favorable strategically to
again file charges.
The issue has been complicated somewhat by the decision of the
superior court in Commonwealth v. Mumich 68 that the time period may
indeed commence with the filing of a subsequent complaint when the initial
complaint was substantially defective. 169 This may be a justifiable conclu-
sion when the charge has been dismissed upon the motion of the defend-
ant. 170 But by holding that rule 1100 applies only to complaints properly
filed and not to defective complaints, the court failed to acknowledge that a
seven month delay following an improper complaint can be as oppressive
as a similar delay following a correctly filed complaint. Furthermore, the
prosecution could avoid confounding the underlying purpose of the prompt
trial rule by obtaining a vital time extension in compliance with rule
1100(c) upon the dismissal of the defective complaint.' 17
III. Remedies
The sole remedy recognized for the violation of the sixth amendment
right to a speedy trial is dismissal of the charges with prejudice. 72 This
does not of itself dictate that all other schemes that provide for the prompt
disposition of cases must adopt the same harsh sanction;I73 the defendant
may yet be discharged if his constitutional rights have been violated.
Undoubtedly, society has a valid interest in having the guilt or innocence of
a defendant determined, but the societal interest should not subvert the
right of the accused to a fair trial. Permanent discharge of a defendant who
may be guilty of a heinous crime is a severe remedy, particularly when he
has already been convicted and sentenced but is raising the prompt trial
issue on appeal. Nevertheless, the conviction of a person whose defense
may have been impaired by a violation of his constitutional rights is a
dubious victory. 174 Arguably rule 1100 is merely a mechanism for expedit-
ing criminal proceedings and its violation does not warrant dismissal. But
this interpretation fails to recognize that the rule was promulgated to make
more certain the elusive contours of the constitutional guarantee. 175 Other
complaint is filed and not upon arrest. Consequently the prompt trial privileges would
logically attach to only those charges set forth in the complaint. Though this permits the
prosecutor to prolong the preprosecution period and circumvent rule 1100 by filing charges
serially, the situation could be rectified by extending the coverage of the rule by amendment
to those possible charges of which the prosecutor is aware or should be aware when the arrest
is made.
168. - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 361 A.2d 359, 361 (1976).
169. Id. at-, 361 A.2d at 361.
170. See ABA SPEEDY TRIAL STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 2.2(b) & comment at 24.
171. Commonwealth v. Bush, 27 Bucks 54, 56 (Pa. C.P. 1975).
172. Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973).
173. The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3162 (Supp. 1976), for example,
provides for dismissal with or without prejudice.
174. See Taylor, supra note II, at 8.
175. See Commonwealth v. Mayfield, - Pa. , , 364 A.2d 1345, 1347 (1976);
Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297, 306, 297 A.2d 127, 131-32 (1972).
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sanctions may have a more positive impact on the criminal justice system
and societal values; they cannot, however, compensate the defendant
whose constitutional rights have been disregarded and who has been
rendered unable to establish his innocence.
Although potent arguments have been propounded for alternative
remedies, they have been persuasive primarily because courts are emi-
nently conscious of the harsh results of dismissal with prejudice and have
thus been reluctant to find violations of the speedy trial right. 176 An award
of civil damages may well recompense the accused who is ultimately
acquitted. Nonetheless, a deprivation of constitutional rights cannot be
translated into a monetary equivalent. To discourage dilatory practices, a
penalty may and should be imposed upon the prosecuting attorney or
defense counsel for unjustifiably delaying trial. 177 But this sanction is
merely ancillary and falls far short of atoning the accused for his ordeal. If
the indictment or charge is dismissed without prejudice, reprosecution
would not only result in unnecessary expense and an increased burdenon
the grand jury system, 178 but would also prolong the delay and subvert the
prompt trial mandate. 179 The court could also credit the defendant with the
time consumed by an excessive delay in the event the defendant is
convicted and sentenced to prison. 180 This remedy would appease the
protectional needs of society and partially restore to the defendant what the
government has taken away,' 81 but could do little to console an accused
who raises the rule 1100 issue during the pretrial period or a convicted
defendant whose defense has been impaired. Dismissal with prejudice
might be reserved for the instance in which a nonspeculative possibility
exists that the accused's ability to defend has been prejudiced. 182 By
adopting a 180 day limitation that will culminate in either dismissal or
trial, 183 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has acknowledged, however, that
a probability of prejudice inheres when a delay exceeds those limits. The
ultimate safeguard against the denial of a speedy trial must unquestionably
be expeditious proceedings. The severe sanction of conclusive dismissal
176. E.g., Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27 STAN. L. REV.
525, 539, 543 (1975); Myers, Devitalization of the Right to a Speedy Trial: The "Per Case"
Method v. The "PerSe" Theory, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 106, 125 (1973); 3 W. ST. L. REV. 334, 335
(1976).
177. See Note, Right to Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 846,861 (1957). See
generally Taylor, supra note If, at 15. See the Philadelphia Bulletin, August 1, 1976, § I, at 30,
col. 1, for an account of the imposition of a penalty on defense and prosecution attorneys for
delaying proceedings.
178. [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7430.
179. ABA SPEEDY TRIAL STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4.1 & comment at 40-41; 8 COLUM.
J. L. Soc. P. 356, supra note II, at 391.
180. See United States v. Strunk, 467 F.2d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 412 U.S. 434,
440 (1973).
181. Wideikis, Rejection of the Compensatory Remedy with Respect to the Right to a
Speedy Trial: The Conclusion of the Marion, Barker, Strunk Trilogy, 7 J. MARSHALL J. 253,
257 (1972).
182. Amsterdam, supra note 176, at 537.
183. Section (f) of rule 1100 provides in pertinent part,
At any time before trial, the defendant or his attorney may apply to the court for an
order dismissing the charges with prejudice on the ground that this rule has been
violated. . . . Any order granting such application shall dismiss the charges with
prejudice and discharge the defendant.
alone can ensure the expedition of proceedings while meaningfully pre-
serving the defendant's speedy trial rights.18 4
IV. Waiver of Prompt Trial Rule Protection
Like the right to a speedy trial, the safeguards of rule 1100 may be
waived. These rights are not coterminous, however, and a waiver that
would be adequate to waive the procedural right might not suffice to waive
the constitutional right. Waiver of a fundamental constitutional right
cannot be presumed from a silent record'85 but can be discerned from a
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent act.' 8 6 Implicitly there can be no
intelligent and knowing waiver of the right to a speedy trial unless an
individual upon becoming an accused is apprised of that right and is
immediately furnished with counsel who can advise him how to assert it.
The federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974, for example, contemplates that
every defendant in federal court be properly advised of his right to a speedy
trial and the remainder of his sixth amendment rights prior to the entry of
his plea to the charges.' 7 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet
delineated the contours of waiver of prompt trial protection, but has
reasoned that satisfaction of the requirements for a valid waiver of
constitutional rights will be adequate under rule 1100. 188
The accused will be deemed to have waived the protection of rule
1100 when he is represented by counsel and knows that a time extension
requested by the Commonwealth will postpone trial beyond the 180 day
period, but nevertheless agrees to the extension. 19 Failure to contest the
validity of a time extension until the 180 day period has expired results in a
waiver of that issue. 190 By giving the appearance of approval to the court's
scheduling trial beyond the specified time limits, the accused is estopped to
subsequently assert a violation of rule 1100.191 Acquiescence in the
appointment of counsel with a substantial trial backlog, however, does not
waive the constitutional right to a speedy trial' 92 and should have no greater
impact on prompt trial claims under rule 1100.
A failure to petition for dismissal prior to trial and thus to preserve the
issue for post-trial motions and eventual appeal constitutes a procedural
waiver. 193 This waiver may not be overridden by the argument that basic
184. See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973).
185. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516
(1962); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389,
393 (1937).
186. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
187. [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7442.
188. Commonwealth v. Myrick, - Pa. -, -, 360 A.2d 598, 600 (1976).
189. Id. at-, 360 A.2d at 600. An express waiver will be found if the accused is accepted
into a pretrial probation program upon motion by the prosecution and concurrence by the
defendant. This accelerated rehabilitative disposition program is instituted by PA. R. CRIM. P.
175-85. Rule 178 provides that the defendant must be fully apprised of the implications of
acceptance into the program.
190. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 124 Pitts. 208, 211 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1976).
191. Commonwealth v. Hickson, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 496, 498, 344 A.2d 617,618 (1975).
192. Commonwealth v. Williams, 457 Pa. 502, 509 n.9, 327 A.2d 15, 18 n.9 (1974).
193. Commonwealth v. Roundtree, 458 Pa. 351, 355, 326 A.2d 285, 287 (1974); seeABA
SPEEDY TRIAL STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4.1 & comment at 41.
and fundamental rights cannot be waived. Requiring that objection be
taken by both pretrial and post-trial motion permits the court to correct
alleged errors and may obviate the need for appellate review, thus
conserving judicial resources. 194 While failure to petition for dismissal of
charges prior to trial would in most instances be construed as a waiver, a
rare occasion may arise in which to require the accused to file a pretrial
motion would be a mere exercise in futility. 95 The supreme court has
recently insisted upon strict observance of procedural requirements 96 and
it is thus unlikely that laxity on the part of the accused will be regarded
generously. Nonetheless, it is doubtful whether the court would consider
the speedy trial issue waived by inaction when the accused had never been
aware of his rights' 97 either under the sixth amendment or under the prompt
trial rule.
V. Appellate Jurisdiction
An order denying a petition for dismissal of charges pursuant to rule
1100(f) is interlocutory and is therefore considered not appealable. Ordi-
narily the accused has no right of appeal before judgment and sentence. 1
98
This broad doctrine is subject to qualification when an issue of basic human
rights is concerned. 199 Notwithstanding the exhortation in Klopfer v. North
Carolina that the right to speedy trial "is as fundamental as any of the
rights secured by the sixth amendment,' '200 the Pennsylvania Superior
Court has held that a claim of the denial of the right to speedy trial does not
raise an exceptional circumstance permitting immediate appeal.2°' The
prevailing rule, therefore, is that when there has been a hearing below on
the speedy trial issue, the right to a speedy trial can be protected adequately
by review following trial. 202 If, however, the right to speedy trial includes
the right not to be tried at all once the accused has suffered an unjustifiable
delay, and if it is fully acknowledged that oppressive pretrial incarceration
and anxiety contravene the speedy trial guarantee, then it is totally illogical
to hold that an order denying a petition to dismiss lacks sufficient finality to
merit appeal .
203
194. Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418,421-22,326 A.2d 272,274(1974); Dilliplaine v.
Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 258-59, 322 A.2d 114, 116 (1974); Commonwealth v.
Butch, 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 524,527, 361 A.2d 380, 382 (1976); Commonwealth v. Howard, 233
Pa. Super. Ct. 496, 500, 335 A.2d 489, 491 (1975).
195. Commonwealth v. Sprankle, - Pa. Super. Ct. -,-, 361 A.2d 385,386 n. 1 (1976)
(the accused's petition for dismissal of the charges would have been directed to the same court
that granted the challenged time extension).
196. Commonwealth v. Bailey, - Pa.-,-, 344 A.2d 869, 871 (1975); Commonwealth
v. Blair, - Pa. -, -, 331 A.2d 213, 214 n.I (1975).
197. Commonwealth v. Coleman, 458 Pa. 324, 325-26, 327 A.2d 77, 78 (1974).
198. Commonwealth v. Kilgallen, 379 Pa. 315, 320, 108 A.2d 780, 783 (1954).
199. Commonwealth v. Bunter, 445 Pa. 413, 418-19, 282 A.2d 705, 707 (1971).
200. 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1966).
201. Commonwealth v. Bennett, 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 509, 514, 345 A.2d 754, 756 (1975).
See Commonwealth v. Myers, 457 Pa. 317, 319, 322 A.2d 131, 133 (1974). Contra, Common-
wealth v. Bunter, 445 Pa. 415, 419, 282 A.2d 705, 707 (1971).
202. See Commonwealth v. Myers, 457 Pa. 317, 320, 322 A.2d 131, 133 (1974).
203. See Commonwealth v. Barber, 461 Pa. 738, 743-44, 337 A.2d 855, 857 (Roberts &
Manderino, JJ., dissenting).
Interlocutory orders may be appealed in three narrowly defined
instances: when authorized by law, when the appellee has not objected to
the appeal, and when the lower court has certified an issue as a controlling
question of law.204 Although the appellee has not objected to the appeal,
the appellate court may in its discretion refuse to hear the case. 20 5 Because
the courts have paid greater deference to the accused's interest in conduct-
ing an unimpaired defense on the merits than to his other interests protected
by the speedy trial right, appeals at this stage have been disallowed even
though the lower court has certified the question. 2° An order dismissing




To the extent that rule 1100 is designed to implement and protect the
defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial, it is vastly more effective
than the elusive safeguards to the sixth amendment guarantee that have
been articulated by the United States Supreme Court and applied previ-
ously by the courts of Pennsylvania. The time limit expressed in the rule,
however, was never intended to be absolute and thus admits to qualifica-
tions that have not been considered adequately by the appellate courts. The
appellate courts have not unequivocally defined the scope of the terms
"due diligence" and "Commonwealth" in the context of the provision for
time extension; nor have they struck the optimal balance between the
interests of the accused and society. The impact of the prompt trial rule on
retrials caused by mistrials must also be clarified. These flaws are by no
means fatal to the rule-they are merely indicative that the prompt trial rule
has not yet fully evolved.
Nevertheless, the rule's definitive time provisions eliminate much of
the speculation about whether the rights of an accused have been violated in
a particular case. Although identifiable social policies are effectuated by
the prompt disposition of criminal cases, the rule in certain instances will
by its very nature frustrate rather than expedite criminal proceedings, and
might thus inflict serious injury on other valid societal interests. Drastic
harm of this nature should be averted by the allocation of adequate
resources to the criminal justice system, by improvements in administra-
tive procedures, and by the enforcement of the duty of diligence incumbent
upon the courts and upon prosecution and defense attorneys-not by the
dilution of the already limited remedies available to the accused. Strin-
gency, the rule's principal vice, is also its redeeming virtue.
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